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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the governance of pension funds 
in Brazil.  It first demonstrates that the law allows sponsors (employers) to write 
contracts (by-laws) governing the relationships between the sponsors, the managers and 
the participants (employees) of the pension funds.  It also explains that, from an agency 
theory perspective, this legal framework favors non-optimal governance structures, since 
sponsors do not bear the financial consequences of the contracts they create. As 
predicted, the empirical evidence reported in this thesis shows that sponsors use this 
authority to create contracts that minimize monitoring and maximize control over 
business decisions to the greatest extent permitted by law. For instance, the findings show 
that, in writing the by-laws of pension funds, sponsors reduce the functions of 
management bodies in which participants have seats.  Moreover, there is evidence that 
the by-laws contain extra requirements for the members of administrative bodies in order 
to ensure that the individuals elected to these bodies have a contractual or fiduciary 
relationship with the sponsor, and therefore, are within the sponsor’s sphere of influence. 
The paper concludes by identifying some of the areas in which empirical assessment is 
necessary for the recommendation of reforms in the complementary social security 
system in Brazil.
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INTRODUCTION
Social security systems are undergoing major changes in several countries, 
including perhaps the United States.  The discussion on policy choices and efficient 
structures regarding each of these reforms is not limited to specialized scholarship.  Not 
surprisingly for an issue of this magnitude, this discussion is addressed almost every day 
by all sorts of media, the most respected newspapers, politicians, non-governmental 
organizations, trade unions, financial markets players and others.  Tensions arise because 
the interests of each of these groups differ.   
Government concerns regarding its social security system are related to social 
welfare and security.  On the one hand, they should want a system that works and can 
guarantee their citizens protection after retirement; otherwise social security will not be 
achieved.  On the other hand, they may not want to bear the risks of a pay-as-you-go 
system financed with payroll taxes that offers defined benefit plans, as was the typical 
structure of social security system in most of the countries that had a welfare state at 
some point in the past.
The financial market players’ concerns relate to how this huge amount of money 
will be managed and invested in a wide variety of assets.  How speculative, how 
conservative or how activity the managers that control such resources will be is a crucial 
question.  The monitoring of the market by institutional investors is identified as one of 
the most promising alternatives for disciplining management; therefore a common 
discussion in corporate law is the role of the institutional investor in shareholder activism.  
Pension funds are considered the most important institutional investors.  Hence any 
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decision that affects their structure, especially their governance, may cause changes in the 
entire financial system.1
Of course, any citizen is interested in the subject because the social security 
system usually provides the resources for living after retirement.  Worldwide employers 
have been facing the debate curiously, particularly after the Enron scandals.  When Enron 
failed, its workers lost not only their jobs but also their retirement savings, since over 
60% of Enron employees pension funds assets were invested in its stock.2 The Bush 
administration and some members of the American Congress have been promoting the 
privatization of social security system as a way of taking pressure off it. In response to 
the Bush administration efforts, important civil organizations have been bringing the 
debate to the workers.  For instance, AARP, the lobbying organization for older 
Americans that opposes President Bush’s Social Security proposal, ran $5 million in print 
advertisements for a campaign against Bush’s privatization bill.
An important component in any effectively administered social security system is 
a governance structure that properly supervises and incentivizes its administrators.  This 
is particularly true with regards to pension funds within such a system.  Pension funds 
manage enormous pools of capital with the stated objective of providing adequate 
retirement benefits for fund participants.  Whether this capital is faithfully and efficiently 
deployed will depend in large part on the incentives of the managers of the capital.  In the 
case of the pension funds, incentives are intimately tied to the allocation of risks and to 
1 See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 795, 795-796 (1993).
2 See Timolthy Besley & Andrea Prat, Pension Fund Governance and Choice between Defined Benefit and 
Defined Contribution Plans, 13 (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 3955, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=436991.
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the degree to which the funds are administered as defined contribution or defined benefit 
plans.
In Brazilian pension funds, decision makers are generally under the pressure of 
the sponsor’s management and controller, which may be a private corporation or a state 
controlled corporation.  Neither sponsors nor management of pension funds bear the 
wealth consequences of their decisions, and therefore they have weak incentives to 
maximize the value of pension assets.  Even worse, there is evidence that pension funds 
have been used to the satisfaction of sponsors’ desires both in the private and public 
sectors. 
This paper documents and analyses under agency theory the governance 
structures of the existing pension funds in Brazil through an empirical research on the by-
laws of 30 of these entities.  It is focused on the organizational structure and on the 
incentive system facing their investment decision makers.  Brazilian law stipulates a 
basic three-tier internal governance structure and a few requirements of the members of 
each tier.  Other than this statutory outline, the governance mechanisms of individual 
funds are largely discretionary and are determined by the particular provisions of the 
fund’s by-laws.  Those by-laws, in turn, are generally drafted by the fund sponsors, 
subject to the nominal constraint of approval by regulators.  This paper explores what the 
drafters of by-laws (sponsors/employers) include in the by-laws, why they choose to 
include it, and the consequences of these choices on the governance of Brazilian pension 
funds.
The core contribution of this paper is to demonstrate, theoretically and 
empirically, the weakness of the governance of Brazilian complementary social security 
4
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system.  This is a particularly important issue now due to the recent pension reforms.  As 
a result of these reforms, explained in Part I below, new pension funds will be created in 
molds very similar to ones that comprise the sample of this empirical research. It will be 
useful for the workers in both the private and public sectors to think about a way to 
strengthen the current legal framework.   
While the analysis presented in this paper is in many ways very simple, it is a first 
step towards identifying challenging theoretical questions and suggesting directions for 
future research and policy debate in Brazil on a very relevant issue, about which 
scholarly analysis is still scarce.
This paper is organized into three parts.  Part I describes the Brazilian social 
security system and analyzes the legal and institutional framework regulating entidades 
fechadas de previdencia privada (EFPCs), the organizational form of the Brazilian 
pension funds. 
Part II reviews the concepts of agency theory and discusses how they can be used 
to analyze the Brazilian regulatory scenario.  The theoretical tools offered by agency 
theory will be helpful in two ways.  First, they will help identify the weakness of the 
organizational structure of the Brazilian pension funds market.  Second, they will help 
determine the appropriate governance structure for pension funds.  Part II also presents 
the hypothesis of how sponsors draft by-laws of pension funds by predicting, from a 
theoretical standpoint, how agents will react to the Brazilian regulatory scenario. 
Part III describes the methodology used to conduct the empirical study, as well as 
the findings of the study.  Relevant data collected in the empirical investigation is found 
5
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in Appendices I and II.  Part III also contains an analysis of the findings and cooperation 
between the predictions stated in Part II and the findings of the empirical research.
Finally, the conclusion will summarize results and explain policy implications. 
6
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1. BRAZILIAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
1.1 The Tripartite Structure of the Brazilian Social Security System
The social security system in Brazil is comprised of three wholly separate and 
independent systems: (1) a basic general system managed by a body of the federal 
government; (2) a special system for public employees currently administered by 
dispersed governmental units—today the federal government, each state and each county 
has its own administrator of public sector pensions—but that recent legal reform has 
moved to centralize; and (3) a complementary system of pension plans provided by 
private entities. Under Brazilian law, complementary system pension plans are provided 
by financial institutions, by special entities (pension funds) created to provide retirement 
plans, and by certain other entities authorized by competent authorities.3
Although the basic tripartite structure of Brazil’s social security system remains, 
the social security system has recently experienced several major changes. The legal 
instruments of these reforms include constitutional amendments (Amendments 20 and 41 
to the Federal Constitution, dated respectively December 15, 1998, and December 19, 
2003) as well as a whole new set of infra-constitutional statutes and other regulations. 
1.1.1 General System
The general system—a pay-as-you-go system, financed by payroll taxes—is the 
most important part of this tripartite structure. This system is mandatory for all private-
3 MINISTÉRIO DA PREVIDENCIA SOCIAL, PANORAMA DA PREVIDENCIA SOCIAL BRASILEIRA 11 (2004), 
available at http://www.previdenciasocial.gov.br/docs/panoramaPS.pdf. 
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sector workers and is managed by the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto 
Nacional de Seguridade Social or INSS), a governmental entity.  The system provides 
two kinds of benefits: a social assistance benefit, and a length-of-service benefit.  The 
social assistance benefit is granted to those individuals who do not contribute to the 
system or who contribute for a period shorter than the minimum amount of time 
necessary to earn the right to the length-of-service benefit.  These individuals, such as 
pregnant women, senior citizens, and the disabled, do not have to contribute to the social 
security system but will receive benefits.4  The length-of-service benefit requires 
individuals to contribute at a rate set by Brazilian law, depending on one’s wage level.  
Individuals’ contributions are limited to the amount that will ensure the beneficiary a 
retirement benefit equal to R$2,400.00 (equivalent to approximately US$900.00).5  If one 
desires a benefit greater than this amount, the individual must use the private 
complementary system.
1.1.2 Special System for Public Employees
The second part of the tripartite structure, the part most affected by the 
aforementioned reforms, is the special system for public employees.  Similar to the 
general system, this is a mandatory pay-as-you-go system financed by payroll taxes paid 
by the employers and workers of the public sector.  Prior to the reforms, there was no 
limit on the amount that public employees could contribute to and therefore benefit from 
the system.  As a general rule, the contribution was proportional to an individual’s current 
wage and the benefit equal to the last active wage.  Therefore, workers’ benefit was not 
4 See André Portela Souza et al., Fiscal Impacts of Social Security Reform in Brazil (2004), available at
http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2004/artigos/A04A138.pdf.
5 MINISTÉRIO DA PREVIDENCIA SOCIAL, supra note 3, at 30.
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necessarily proportional to the contributions of the worker during his work-life.  The 
reforms involve a number of changes such as setting a minimum age, changing the 
method of calculation of the benefit, readjustment rules, and others.  
Most importantly, however, the reforms enable the government at all levels 
(Federal, State, and Municipal) to subject new public employees6 to the same limits on 
their contributions and benefits to which private employees are subject.7  If the 
government chooses to do this, they must also establish a complementary system so that 
employees have the option to have a private entity match their contributions, thus 
enabling them to surpass the limit of payout set by the government.8  This 
complementary system shall be implemented through a specific form of pension funds 
called Entidades Fechadas de Previdência Complementar (“EFPCs”), better known in 
Brazil as pension funds, and addressed in Section 1.1.3 below.  
These to-be-created EFPCs must be sponsored by public entities and must offer to 
its participants exclusively-defined contribution plans9 through the general system and 
through the special system for public employees, as opposed to the defined benefit 
currently offered by the government.10 It is also important to note that the Federal 
Constitution prohibits the government and all public companies from transferring funds 
to such pension funds, except for the ordinary contributions made as sponsors.  
6
 The public employees hired before the implementation of the relevant complementary system can be 
subject to the new system only upon previous and express agreement (Constituição Federal [C.F.] 
[Constitution] art. 40, §16, amended by Constituição Federal [C.F.] amend. 20). 
7
 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 40, §14, amended by Constituição Federal [C.F.] amend. 
20. 
8 Id.
9
 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 40, §15, amended by Constituição Federal [C.F.] amend. 
41. 
10
 The trend of a shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans is not only a Brazilian 
phenomenon.  In the U.S., contributions to defined benefit plans amounted to 18% of the total contributions 
in 1985 and today they amount to 80% of the total contributions. See Timolthy Besley & Andrea Prat,
supra note 2, at 2-4.     
9
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Furthermore, contributions made by the government and public companies as sponsors 
may not be higher than the contribution made by the participant of the plan.11
When implemented, these reforms will transfer a large amount of wealth to the 
management of the new pension funds.  The government predicts that these reforms can 
increase pension savings by 50% by 2008.12  It also appears as though these pension 
funds will be created soon, as the Secretaria de Previdencia Complementar, the federal 
executive branch department responsible for the government’s interaction with the 
pension funds, included the implementation of this new system as one of its four main 
goals for the years of 2004 and 2005.
1.1.3 Complementary System
Finally, the third part of the tripartite structure of the Brazilian social security 
system is the private and voluntary complementary system.  The complementary system 
is made up of Entidades Abertas de Previdência Privada (“EAPCs”) and Entidades 
Fechadas de Previdência Complementar (“EFPCs”).  EAPCs, include any financial 
institution authorized by the government to offer individual pension plans as a service to 
either a person or to a company.  When employers and employees enter into such a 
pension plan, they are essentially buying a financial service as they will have no say in 
the investment decisions or other issues.  The Brazilian Central Bank (Banco Central do 
Brasil) and the National Monetary Committee (Conselho Monetário Nacional) regulate 
the EAPCs and the Superintendent for Private Insurance (Superintendência de Seguros 
Privados) monitors them.
11
 Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 202, §3, amended by Constituição Federal [C.F.] amend. 
20. 
12MINISTÉRIO DA PREVIDENCIA SOCIAL, supra note 3, 49.
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EFPCs are created by an employer or group of employers as formally independent 
foundations or non-profit limited liability partnerships.13  The sole purpose of EFPCs is to 
manage the funds of their participants.  Formally, the employees and employers are 
jointly responsible for deciding and monitoring the way in which the pension assets are 
managed—as it will be showed later, this paper claims that in practice workers have very 
little role in deciding and monitoring the management of pension assets.
  EFPCs are currently responsible for 90% of the Brazilian social security 
complementary system,14 a percentage that has grown rapidly over the last few years.  In 
the last 8 years, the total amount of assets in EFPCs has increased from R$72 billions to 
R$231 billions.15,16  Furthermore, the rate of growth has accelerated.  Between December 
2001 and December 2002, the total value of assets in EFPCs increased about 11%,17
while between December 2002 and December 2003, the value increased by 26.9%.  This 
impressive expansion has increased the importance of pension funds within the national 
economy.  By December 2003, the total value of assets in EFPCs was equal to 18.2% of 
the GDP.18  In addition, the Federal Constitution designated EFPCs as the form of entity 
to be implemented under the complementary system for new public employees, as 
13
 Since 2001, the law also authorizes professional or labor associations (as trade unions) to create and 
manage pension funds.  However, very few have been created so far— only 4 such pension funds had been 
created as of December 2003.   When created by professional or labor associations, pension funds should 
delegate the managements of their assets to a specialized entity authorized to operate by the Brazilian 
Central Bank.  Since their managers will not be responsible for investment decisions, even when these 
pension funds are created they will not be relevant for this paper.
14 MINISTÉRIO DA PREVIDENCIA SOCIAL, supra note 3, 48. 
15 SECRETARIA DE PREVIDENCIA COMPLEMENTAR, INFORME ESTATISTICO (July 2004), available at
http://www.previdenciasocial.gov.br/12.asp.
16
 These values do not take into consideration inflation, which, according to the official index of the 
government (IPC-A), was close to 80% for the period, and, according to the most widely used index for 
readjustment of agreements in Brazil, was close to 145% for the period.
17
 Before that, the growth of pension-fund financial assets in relation to GDP increased between 1980 and 
1997: 1% (1980); 3% (1990); 11% (1997). At http://www.ocde.org/.
18
 LCV News, News about Corporate Governance – January-February/2004, available at 
http://www.lcvco.com.br/english/lcvnews.htm.
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explained in Section 1.1.2 above.    
Because of the great importance of EFPCs, this paper will focus exclusively on 
the governance of EFPCs.  
1.2 Governance of Pension Funds (EFPCs) Under Brazilian Law
As mentioned above, the current Brazilian EFPCs are created and sponsored by a 
corporation or a group of corporations, and, therefore, they are all technically created by 
a private entity.19  However, Brazilian regulation categorizes the EFPCs into two 
different groups: privately-sponsored pension funds and publicly- sponsored pension 
funds.20  This categorization is determined, not by who actually created and sponsored 
the fund, but by who has effective control of the sponsor.  If the corporate control of the 
sponsor is held by a private party, then the pension fund is considered to be privately-
sponsored.  If the effective control of the sponsor is held by a public entity or an entity 
controlled by a public entity, the pension fund is considered to be publicly-sponsored.  
This categorization is important because Brazilian pension funds are subject to different 
rules of governance depending on their being considered as either privately-sponsored or 
publicly-sponsored.
The governance of pension funds sponsored by private entities is established by 
section 35, chapter III of Lei Complementar no. 10921 and the governance of pension 
funds sponsored by public entities is established by section 9, chapter III of Lei 
Complementar no. 108.22  Both statutes set forth a mandatory three tier structure 
19
 The recent reforms authorize unions to create pension funds but none have been created so far.
20
 Lei Complementar No. 109, de 29 de Maio de 2001, D.O.U. de 30.05.2001, Capítulo III, art. 31.
21
 Id. art. 35.
22
 Lei Complementar No. 108, de 29 de Maio de 2001, D.O.U. de 30.05.2001, Capítulo III, art. 9.
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including: (1) a conselho deliberativo (a deliberative council); (2) a diretoria executiva
(executive officers); and (3) a conselho fiscal (a fiscal council).   The first two bodies 
have managerial functions, while the third one has a monitoring function.
The functions and responsibilities of the deliberative council and the executive 
officers, as well as the division of power between them are unclear.  With regards to the 
pension funds sponsored by private entities, there is no rule providing parameters for 
these bodies’ functions, therefore the by-laws of the pension funds sponsored by private 
corporations have to establish all the functions and powers of these bodies.  
Pension funds sponsored by public entities, however, have the functions of these 
bodies establishes by Lei Complementar no. 108. The deliberative council has 
competence to decide on the following matters: (1) general management policy of the 
pension fund and of each of its individual plans23; (2) amendment of the pension fund’s 
by-laws and amendments to the rules of each of the individual pension plans; (3) the 
creation or extinction of a pension plan; (4) withdraw of one of the pension’s sponsors (in 
case there are more than one); (5) policy of the investment management and plan of 
investment; (6) approval of a investment when it amounts more than 5% of the pension 
guarantor assets24; (7) hiring outside auditing companies; (8) election and dismissal of the 
executive officers; (9) examining, in an appeal level, the decisions of the executive 
officers.  By statute, the executive officers of pension funds sponsored by public entities 
23
 One single pension fund may have more than one pension plan with different characteristics, terms and 
conditions.  
24
 ‘Guarantor assets’ is an account term defined by law that means all the assets of the investment program, 
plus cash and equivalents, minus operational payable accounts.  See Resolução CMN No. 3.121, de 25 de 
setembro de 2003, D.O.U. de 26.09.2003, Anexo I, art. 1, § 1º. “Para efeito deste regulamento, consideram-
se recursos garantidores dos planos de benefícios administrados pela entidade os ativos do programa de 
investimentos, adicionadas as disponibilidades e deduzidos os valores a pagar, classificados no exigível 
operacional do referido programa.” 
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should carry out the day-to-day affairs of the entity subject to policy approved by the 
deliberative council.25 26
There are two requirements pertaining to the composition of privately-sponsored 
pension funds.  First, the by- laws of such pension funds must demand that at least one 
third of the deliberative counsel and one third of the fiscal counsel are composed by 
workers that are part of the fund.  Second, the individuals to be appointed to the 
deliberative and fiscal councils must meet the following requirements: (1) they must have 
previously participated in financial, management or accounting activities; (2) they must 
not have been convicted of any crime; and (3) they must not have been convicted in any 
administrative process for violation of the regulations set by the social security system or 
for any other infractions as a public employee.  In addition to the requirements made of 
members of the deliberative and fiscal council, a graduate degree (in any discipline) is 
required of executive officers.    
Publicly-sponsored pension funds are faced with a more detailed set of 
governance rules.  First, the members of the deliberative council are non-removable such 
that they can only be dismissed from their office by resignation, judicial conviction for 
criminal conduct, or by an administrative disciplinary process.  
Second, requirements pertaining to the composition of the deliberative council are 
more stringent.  The statute states that the deliberative council shall be composed of up to 
six members, three of whom must be appointed by the workers and three of whom may 
25 Supra 22, art. 19.
26It is unclear whether by-laws could change these competences. In the Brazilian system there are some 
legal rules that can be changed by the agreement among private parties and others that cannot. When the 
legislator wants to make clear that the rule can be modified by contract, s/he often uses the expression 
“unless otherwise agreed by the parties” before the relevant rule; on the other hand, when the legislator 
wishes to ensure that a provision will not be changed by private parties, s/he often uses expressions as “this 
matter is to be exclusively decided by” or “unless otherwise established by law”. The ambiguity happens 
when the statute does not explicit express whether the norm is modifiable or not. 
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be appointed by the sponsor.  All members have a four-year term in office.  Regardless of 
the balance in the number of members, the public sponsor of pension fund appoints the 
president of the deliberative council and the president’s vote prevails in the event of an 
impasse.  
The legal requirements for the individuals appointed to the management 
(deliberative council and executive officers) and monitoring bodies (fiscal council) of 
publicly-sponsored pension funds are similar to those for the individuals appointed to 
these bodies of privately-sponsored funds.  First, they must have previously participated 
in financial, management or accounting activities.  Second, they must not have been 
convicted of any crime.  Third, they must not have been convicted in any administrative 
process for violation of the regulations set by the social security system or for any other 
infractions as a public employee.  
Apart from the rules described above that are set forth in Lei Complementar no. 
108 and Lei Complementar no. 109, a fund’s by-laws establish the vast majority of the 
fund’s governance regulations.  The by-laws are generally drafted, enacted and modified 
by the sponsors of the funds which gives the sponsors leverage over the decision-making 
process of these funds, particularly investment decisions.
1.3 Insolvency Rules for Pension Funds
Insolvency rules applicable to pension funds might not be directly related to 
governance structure; however, for the purposes of analyzing the governance structure of 
the Brazilian pension funds under an agency theory perspective, it is important to know 
who bears the risk of insolvency of these entities.     
15
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In the event that the assets of the pension fund are not sufficient to meet its 
obligations, the competent governmental authority, the Complementary Pension System 
Secretariat (Secretaria de Previdência Complementar), can intervene in pension fund 
administration by dismissing all the managers and appointing a custodian to manage the 
fund.  This custodian will manage the fund as long as it is necessary to evaluate the 
financial conditions of the plan and draft a recuperation plan.27  The recuperation plan 
can recommend certain business measures in order to recover the financial vigor of the 
entity, or call for a liquidation procedure of the fund, called “extrajudicial liquidation.” 
Under extrajudicial liquidation, fund participants receive elevated priority—the same 
protection furnished under Brazilian law to tax authorities and employee creditors—with 
regard to the assets of certain account reserves.  In relation to all other fund assets, fund 
participants are in the same position of any other creditor. 
Fund sponsors and fund managers are generally not liable for deficiencies.  Fund 
managers can be made responsible for a deficiency only if the insolvency resulted from 
unlawful acts committed by them.  Fund sponsors can be made responsible for a 
deficiency if the insolvency was caused by a failure to make their complete required 
contributions to the fund or if it resulted from unlawful acts by them. 
There is no legal obligation for pension funds to obtain insurance. Therefore, it is 
not an exaggeration to say that fund participants ultimately bear the risk of insolvency of 
Brazilian pension funds.  And, the risk of participants (employees) here is to lose all the 
retirement complementary savings if the pension fund fails.  
For the sake of comparison, the U.S. rules for defined benefit plans under 
insolvency are worth mentioning here.  In the event that the assets of the fund are not 
27 Supra note 20, art. 44, 45 and 46.
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sufficient to meet the pension obligations, sponsoring employer is obligated to supply the 
deficiency.28  Insolvency of the firm, however, will result in the inability to cover the 
deficiency. In this event, there is an insurance provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation.29  Employers pay plan termination insurance premiums to this entity, which 
in turn guarantees pension benefits up to a maximum set by law and adjusted yearly.30
For plans ended in 2005, workers who retire at age 65 can receive up to $3,801.14 a 
month.31
 The fact that in Brazil the design of the structure that will produce the 
management and investment decisions is on the hands of the sponsor, and the risks of 
these decisions are borne by the workers suggest that serious problems exist in the 
governance structure of these funds, since the sponsor will not bear the consequences of 
the decisions s/he will control.  
1.4 Evidence of Problems in the Governance of Brazilian Pension Funds 
Although a theoretical analysis of the legal framework described in Sections 1.2 
and 1.3 above may identify many weaknesses in the governance rules and structure of the 
governance of the pension funds in Brazil (see Part II), these rules—particularly with 
regard to the complementary system—actually represent an effort to build a more stable 
Brazilian social security system in the face of government pension fund scandals.  
28
 Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1982).
29
 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is a federal government corporation established by ERISA. id., to 
encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans. It is headed by an 
Executive Director who reports to a Board of Directors consisting of the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce 
and Treasury, with the Secretary of Labor as Chairman. See http://www.pbgc.gov/laws/default.htm.
30 Bill Shaw, Moshe Hagigi & W. Clifford Atherton, Jr., Investment Prudence and Fiduciary Responsibility 
in Managing Defined Benefit Pension Funds Under ERISA, 22 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 83, 84-85 (1988).
31
 The guarantee is lower for those who retire early or when there is a benefit for a survivor. The guarantee 
is increased for those who retire after age 65.
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Brazil is not a unique case.  Governance regulation of pension funds has not 
always existed in other countries. As in Brazil, it has generally been introduced as a 
response to cases of fraud or misappropriation of pension assets.  Two examples can be 
mentioned: the United Kingdom and the United States.32  The fiduciary standards 
introduced by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 in the 
United States were largely in response to cases of fraud in pension fund management and 
of plan insolvency caused by the bankruptcy of the plan sponsor.  Similarly, in the United 
Kingdom, the decision to enhance the responsibility of trustees over pension fund 
management and to increase their independence in relation to pension fund sponsors was 
primarily a response to the Maxwell scandal.33
The previous regulations34 did not include any provisions regarding the 
governance of pension funds.  Furthermore, the limited regulations regarding the 
management of these entities were quite surprising.  One provision, for example, allowed 
the managers of the pension funds to be the same as the managers of the sponsors, as long 
as the assets of the fund and the sponsor were separate.35  This structure obviously does 
not prevent agency problems between sponsors, participants and managers but rather 
enables such problems.  In part as a result of such flawed regulation, Brazil has 
experienced various pension fund scandals, many of which have yet to be resolved.  This 
Section describes some of these problems, which together with the theoretical analysis 
and findings of the empirical research, point to the weaknesses of the current regulation 
32
 Those examples were taken from JUAN YERMO & ANNAMARIA MAROSSY, INSURANCE AND PRIVATE
PENSIONS COMPENDIUM FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES (2001) available at www.oecd.org/daf/insurance-
pension.
33 The Maxwell companies’ main pension fund lost a large percentage of its assets as a result of lending to 
and investing in insolvent companies linked to Robert Maxwell.
34
 Lei No. 6.435, de 15 de Julho de 1977, amended by Lei No. 6.462. 
35 Id. art. 50.
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of the governance of pension funds.  The following three examples are illustrative of the 
inadequacy of the current governance structure.  
First, the frequent actuarial inadequacy of the funds’ investments highlights the 
flaws of pension fund governance.  While there is no official data available on this issue, 
of the given sub-sample of 15 privately-sponsored pension funds, only seven36 disclose 
actuarial expertise information on their website.  Among these seven entities, four had an 
actuarial deficit, which means they either made poor investment decisions or used poor 
funding strategies.  Three had adequate actuarial results.  
This data is relevant for two reasons.  First, it points to a lack of transparency by 
the pension funds, notwithstanding the legal requirements.  Pension funds have very few 
disclosure obligations in relation to governmental authorities and even less with regards 
to their participants.  Every pension fund must annually prepare financial statements and 
carry out actuarial analysis and then file the resultant documents with the competent 
governmental authority and disclose them to participants.37  The law does not provide any 
details as to the means which pension funds should use to file this documentation or 
disclosure such information to the participants. Also the law38 requires the funds to 
inform the participants about their individual plans and benefits once a year, however it 
does not provide any details as to the means of notification and about what exactly the 
funds should inform the participants. The participants may also have access to 
information upon request in order to defend or understand their rights, but the procedures 
for accessing this information are not clear.  
The fact that pension funds do not disclose actuarial expertise information on their 
36 Fundação Itaubanco, BANESPREV, Elos, Telos, Fundação A. F. Xavier Fontana, Sistel, and Aerus.
37 Supra note 20, art. 22.
38 Supra note 20, art. 24.
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websites is shocking because it shows that the pension funds do not volunteer much 
information, unless they feel firmly obligated by law to do so even when the costs for 
doing are as low as upload a document and make it available on their website.  
Second, since four out of the seven entities examined showed actuarial deficits, 
this data indicates that a substantial number of the pension funds have inadequate 
investing or funding practices.  This lack of transparency and poor management decisions 
suggest that serious problems exist in the governance structure of these funds.                 
The second piece of evidence that indicates that there is a weak governance 
structure is the frequent existence of debt owed by sponsors to the pension funds.  As a 
general rule, a pension plan is funded by contributions from employees and proportional 
contributions of these employees’ sponsors (equal or lower than the contribution of the 
employee), in accordance with the specific plan rules.  However, it is fairly common 
when facing financial constraints for these sponsors to stop making their contribution 
without justification and negotiate the payment with the pension fund management 
afterwards.  Although precise information on the total amount that sponsors owe to 
pension funds is not publicly available, the fact that a resolution was passed,39 that set 
forth the rules for the negotiation of debt-service plans, indicates that such a situation was 
frequent enough to necessitate a regulation.  In addition, when sponsors implement a plan 
to pay off their debt, pension funds often seek to create the impression that they are doing 
an act of good service when, in reality, they are just remedying a prior irresponsible act.          
The third example is the scandals involving Previ, the pension fund for the 
employees of a Banco do Brasil (a state-controlled financial institution), which is the 
largest in Brazil and controls assets valued at approximately 25 billon dollars (see 
39
 Resolution CGPC No. 17, 11 de julho de 1996.
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Appendix II).  As all other pension funds, and as required by its by-laws, Previ was 
supposed to be a private and independent entity40.  However, since the government 
controls Previ’s sponsor, Banco do Brasil, some argue that the federal government had 
(and may still have) immense power over Previ’s investment decisions. As a result, many 
believe that Previ’s resources were used to finance sectors that the government deemed 
important for the national economy.
This perception that the government influences the investment decision of public 
sponsored pension funds does not seem to be particular to Brazil.  Roberta Romano, 
discussing public pension funds and the debate over shareholder activism in corporate 
governance,41 argues that public fund managers are subject to considerable political 
pressure to temper investment policies with local, state and federal government 
considerations, such as fostering in-state employment, which are not aimed at 
maximizing the value of their portfolios' assets.  She mentions as an example that during 
the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton advocated using public pension funds to 
finance infrastructure projects.42
40
 Estatuto da Caixa de Previdência dos Funcionários do Banco do Brasil, art. 1, available at 
http://www.previ.com.br/.
41 See Roberta Romano, supra note 1, at 795.
42 The conclusions of R. Romano are similar to the findings of K. J. Murphy and K. Van Nuys. Those 
authors conducted empirical research on the management of American pension funds in 1994.  They were 
interested in analyzing the incentive and governance structures of state and corporate pension systems, 
focusing on the fact that decision authority in state systems is often vested in system participants and in the 
private system is often held by individual with fiduciary duties to the corporation--participants have 
relatively little control over management of the funds in pension funds sponsored by corporations. With 
respect to pension funds sponsored by public entities, the authors found that managers can easily draw 
negative attention from politicians and the press if their decisions generate negative investment outcomes. 
Their hypothesis is that, relative to privately sponsored pension funds, publicly sponsored funds are run by 
“caretakers,” who manage the pension to reduce the chance of engendering negative attention from the 
press and politicians. This leads to particularly conservative investment behavior by state fund managers, 
who hold more of their portfolios in bonds, and less in equities, manage more of their assets in-house, and 
pay their outside money managers smaller, less performance-based fees than their corporate counterparts. 
With respect to pension funds sponsored by private entities, the authors also found significant conflicts of 
interest.  U.S. corporate pension funds’ assets are typically managed by the corporate pension fund 
managers. These managers are responsible for selecting and monitoring external money managers and 
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The government’s influence over Previ was most apparent during the Brazilian 
privatization program.  During and following Brazil’s privatization program of the late 
1990’s, pension funds sponsored by companies controlled by the government were 
repeatedly criticized for being too involved with the companies or groups which 
supported the president at the time.  Critics of the government believe that these funds 
were, and still are, making risky investments by financing certain companies or by taking 
part in consortiums in order to assure that the government’s favorite buyers were 
successful in the privatization auctions.  
These critics’ arguments were supported by the contents of several tapes divulged 
by Folha de São Paulo, a major Brazilian newspaper, in 1998.  These tapes include many 
telephone conversations, the most controversial of which was held between the president 
at the time, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and the president of the Brazilian Development 
Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – BNDES), André Lara 
Resende.43  In this conversation, Lara Resende asked for the President’s permission to 
use the President’s name to pressure Previ’s officers.  Lara Resende wanted to make 
Previ participate in and contribute money to a certain consortium that would take part in 
the privatization auction of Telebras, the state-controlled telecommunication company.  
The President gave Lara Resende his permission.44
The public disclosure of this conversation had many political ramifications.  Luiz 
allocating fund assets across asset types. These current managers generally report to the board of directors 
or one or more officers of the corporation who simultaneously serve as fiduciaries for plan participants and 
shareholders (as corporate officers).  “Thus, while individuals making investment and benefit decisions for 
corporate pension plans are fiduciaries for plan beneficiaries, they are also bound, through the corporate 
hierarchy, to a fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders.” See Kevin J. Murphy & Karen Van Nuys, 
Governance, Behavior, and Performance of State and Corporate Pension Funds (Working Paper 1994), 
available at http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~kjmurphy/Pensions.pdf.
43
 Transcriptions of these tapes are available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/circulo/pre_sp_3.htm.
44
 These tapes could not be used as evidence in judicial processes because they were illegally recorded.
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Carlos Mendonça de Barros (the Minister of Telecommunication at the time), Lara 
Resende and a number of members of Previ’s management were dismissed from their 
positions.  In addition, as previously mentioned, stricter regulations of pension funds 
governance, which were enacted some years later, started to be drafted and discussed.45
Although not explicitly acknowledged as such, Previ is still treated as an arm of 
federal government.  For instance, the fund rarely respects the limits imposed by 
regulations.  According to Previ’s Investment Statement regarding the first quarter of 
2004, it has 58% of its assets invested in shares46, eight percentage points above the 
maximum allowed by current regulations47.  Moreover, the regulation sets forth that a 
pension fund should not hold more 20% of the total stock of a company48.  The 
Investment Statement regarding first quarter of 2004 states also that Previ has 
investments that surpass 20% in 33 companies.49  In some of these invested companies, 
Previ holds 100% of the total stock.50
These three examples point to many weaknesses in the pension fund governance 
structure.  Particularly, they show many situations in which pension funds make decisions 
in the interest of their sponsors, regardless of the obligations these entities have to their 
participants.  Part II, using agency theory, will establish a theoretical framework to 
explain the reasons for such occurrences.
45 See Lei Complementar no. 109 and Lei Complementar no. 108.
46
 Demonstrativo Analítico de Investimentos e enquadramento das Aplicações (segundo trimestre de 2004), 
avaliable at
http://www.previ.com.br/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PG_PREVI/PREVI_INVESTIMENTO_INTERNO/DAIE
A2.PDF.
47
 Resolução do Ministério da Fazenda – Banco Central do Brasil No. 3.121, de 25 de setembro de 2003, 
D.O.U. 26.09.2003, art 25.
48 Id. Art. 26.
49 Supra note 46. 
50Supra note 46.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Agency Theory and Pension Funds
  There are three main players within a pension fund: (1) the sponsor, which is the 
employer or the group of employers, (2) the participants or beneficiaries (principals), who 
are the workers who participate in the pension plan, and (3) the fund managers (agents).51
Agency theory can be applied to analyze the relationship among those players.52
From the perspective of agency theory, pension funds are a network of 
overlapping contracts that specify obligations for those key players.  If sponsors, 
participants and managers had complete contracting ability, the parts would be able to 
agree in the most efficient plan structure and risk allocation for both sides, weighing the 
willingness to take risks, vigilance capacity and market expertise. However, these 
contracts are, as a general rule, incomplete and costly written and enforced. Principals 
rely on two mechanisms to protect their interest and their rights.  The first mechanism is 
the law as it includes rules regarding fiduciary duties and conflict of interests and others 
that require managers to act in the best interest of principals.  The second mechanism is 
the governance structure which may provide protection in two ways.  First, an adequate 
51
 The model described is the simplest possible model.  Some countries use more complex models that 
include monitors and, external audit and validation agents.       
52
 Agency theory addresses the costs arising from an agency relationship (agency costs).  An agency 
relationship is a contract under which a person (agent) acts or performs services on behalf of another 
(principal), and involves, to some extent, the delegation of decision-making authority from the principal to 
the agent.  Assuming that the principal and the agent seek to maximize their utility, the problems in the 
agency relationship arise from the fact that the agent does not always act in the best interests of the 
principal.  Another assumption of agency theory is that the players will always act rationally from an 
economic perspective.  In other words, individuals are always willing to act according to their self-interest.  
Agency costs are those which evolve from the different interests of the principal and agent. Such costs arise 
because the contract that regulates the relationship between agent and principal is not costlessly written and 
enforced. Agency problems arise when contracts are unable to sufficiently protect the interests of the 
principal.  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 304 (1976).
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governance structure can align managers’ interests and principals’ interests, minimizing 
the conflict situation.  Second, an adequate governance structure may enable principals to 
exercise control powers over the managers and compel those in operating control of the 
organization to respect and pursue the principals’ interests. There is a need to match the 
governance structure of the pension funds to the kind of pension contract being used and 
to the incentives of the various parties in such a structure.53
In defined benefit pension plans, participants are promised a pre-specified sum of 
money, received upon retirement.  These benefits may vary depending on the 
participant’s salary, years of service, and may allow for adjustments.  The most 
distinguishing characteristic of the defined benefit plan is that the benefits do not depend 
on the amount contributed to the fund or on the performance of the fund assets. 
Therefore, theoretically, if the contributions and the assets are insufficient to meet the due 
payments, sponsors should increase their contributions in order to meet the obligations.  
On the other hand, if the assets exceed the amount required to meet the due payments, the 
excess could be returned to the plan sponsor54 or the sponsor’s future contributions could 
be reduced.55 Thus, assuming that the fund always pays the agreed amount to the 
participants, in a defined benefit plan, the sponsor is the residual claimant because he/she 
is the one who bears the risk and has the ownership of the return.
In defined contribution pension plans, participants are promised a future sum, 
received upon retirement that is dependent on the performance of the assets that were 
invested in a pre-established manner.  Therefore, the payout depends on the size of the 
53 See Timolthy Besley & Andrea Prat, supra note 2, at 6.
54
 For example, in 1991, California’s governor appropriated $1.6 billion from a surplus account at 
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) and applied it to the state’s budget deficit.
55 See Murphy & Van Nuys, supra note 42, at 5. 
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contributions made and the performance of the assets.  Unlike the ownership in defined 
benefit plans, the ownership of the return in defined contribution plans is held by the 
participant, making participants the residual claimants.  Therefore, if the fund’s 
investments perform poorly, sponsors do not suffer any consequences.
Summarizing, defined contribution and defined benefit plans allocate investment 
risk oppositely. Under a defined contribution plan, the participants (employee) bear the 
burden of disappointing investment results and pockets the gains from good results. 
Under a defined benefit plan the sponsor (employer) bears the investment risk.
In practice, there are also many combination plans that offer a defined benefit 
component which ensures participants a minimum payout upon retirement, and a defined 
contribution component.  Theoretically, sponsors and participants share the risks in these 
plans so they, to some extent, both act as residual claimants.  
An organization’s efficiency depends on the allocation of decision rights and 
residual claims within the organization.  Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen argue that 
decisions should be made by whoever bears the risk of the organization. According to the 
authors, many organizations are managed by individuals who are not the sole residual 
claimants and who therefore do not fully bear the financial consequences of their 
decisions.  In such organizations it is important for the residual claimants to retain 
decision control rights over the management by maintaining the right to hire, fire, and set 
the compensation of the managers.56
Since the residual risk in relation to pension funds shifts from one part to another 
depending on the contractual structure, incentives of the various parties within a pension 
56 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 328, 
327-349 (1983).
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plan are defined by such contractual structure.  Any desired behavior (and governance 
structure) has to be either contractible, at reasonable cost, or incentive compatible.    
For instance, it will be more efficient if the sponsors control the investment 
decisions in a defined benefit plan, since he or she absolves the exceed returns and, as a 
result, has incentives to chose the most efficient investment allocation.  In contrast, in 
defined contribution plans, it is preferable that participants control the assets allocation 
and management, because they have the ownership of the returns.  The fact that sponsors 
do not bear the residual risk on defined contribution plans means that they will not take 
into account the effect of their investment decisions on the expected returns of the 
participants.  The sponsor will be driven purely by her/his private interests.  The opposite 
happens in defined benefit plans controlled by participants, as they neither perceive the 
excess of returns nor bear the insolvency risk, they will take decisions based exclusively 
in their own interest.   
Another example is vigilance.  The comparative advantage in monitoring rests on 
the allocation of residual claims.  If residual claims are going to be borne by the sponsors, 
sponsors have more incentives to monitor.  On the other hand, if the risk is going to be 
borne by the participants, participants would have more incentives to monitor.
Consequently, in defined benefit plans, the sponsor has more incentives to monitor the 
managers, while in defined contribution plans, participants have more incentives to 
monitor the management members. 
Monitoring activities are, however a tricky issue in defined contribution plans. 
Because of the presence of multiple participants in a defined contribution pension plan, it 
is important to keep in mind that participants have a jointly residual claim and each of 
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them does not internalize the full outcome of additional vigilance, creating a free-riding 
problem which decreases the optimal level of monitoring.  As a result, there is a 
reduction on the attractiveness of defined contribution plans, if compared to defined 
benefit plans.  In addition, as monitoring is costly, and it is reasonable to think that 
sponsors have more resources than participants, theoretically in a defined benefit plan 
monitoring efforts would be more constant.57
Certain intermediaries, such as trustees or pension account managers that 
undertake the control power (appoint, hire and dismiss management) and monitoring task 
on behalf of the participants (“trustees”), can be thought as a possible solution to 
overcoming the free-ride problem.  Theoretically, these trustees, if professional investors, 
would also be able to improve pension performance with regards to returns.  The theory 
predicts that professional investors obtain larger returns than retail investors, since they 
have a lower cost of monitoring and they can also better predict assets price in the future.  
Therefore, supposedly assets perform better when administrated by professional 
investors. A third argument in favor of the adoption of professional investors as trustees 
to save the free-riding problem in defined contribution is effect of career concerns, given 
that the market provides strong career concerns.  A professional investor that is perceived 
to be capable and competent would be able to get future rewards in the form of more 
lucrative or prestigious business.
57 See  Besley & Prat, supra note 2, at 16-17.  “The normative lesson is that we should give residual claim 
to the party with better monitoring skills…In practice most people would argue that the sponsor has a 
double advantage over beneficiaries. First, being a unitary player she does not face a free-riding problem. 
Second, she might draw on an in-house expertise to ensure proper monitoring.  If it is true, DB (defined 
benefit) plans should display a better performance than DC (defined contribution) plans, and would provide 
a strong argument in favor of DB. To evaluate this statement, note that performance has two components: 
returns and costs.”
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However, trustees can create other problems to the governance structure.  First, 
the introduction of trustees creates a new agent/principal relationship that implies a new 
set of agency problems to be addressed.  Second, the trustees’ services are costly and they 
may impose a significant reduction of participants’ wealth.  Both problems are significant 
and in ways puzzling.  
To help thinking about the first one it would be adequate to use the corporate 
governance scholarship.  The role of this literature has been in finding existing and 
potential agency problems and trying to propose the most efficient governance 
mechanisms to solve those problems.  Therefore, there is vast literature that could help to 
address the agency problem, especially in a defined contribution plan where it is possible 
to develop a structure by which the compensation of the trustee would be directly linked 
to the performance of the assets. The second problem however seems to be more puzzling 
to solve in theory and practice.  In countries that have adopted a contractual structure that 
include trustees, the high costs of financial intermediaries’ services (that function as 
trustees or pension account managers), is one of the main criticisms.  In the Chilean case, 
for example, the privatization of the pension system created the administradoras de 
fondos de pensiones.  The very high administrative costs imposed by the remuneration of 
the services provided by these entities represent one of the most problematic drawbacks 
for Chilean workers. Costs can run as high as 30% to match similar coverage provided at 
about half the cost by the U.S. Social Security system.  The system has been criticized by 
some as being over five times as expensive as that of the United States, and perhaps the 
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most expensive in the world.58  In the United Kingdom, the estimate is that administrative 
costs of management of the individual accounts take away 25% of the pension value.59
In conclusion, it is worthwhile to restate some of the prepositions developed 
above.  First, pension funds are a network of overlapping incomplete contracts, where 
each player will act according to its own interest unless there is some kind of match 
between governance structure and incentives of the various parties in such a structure.  
Those incentives will depend on the contract chosen and who is the player bearing 
residual risk. In case of pension funds, defined benefit or defined contribution contracts 
are the most common structures.  The role of the governance rules in pension funds is, 
first, to ensure that pension plan members are adequately protected from conflicts of 
interest and related problems, and, second, to guarantee that the governance structure is 
compatible with the incentives of the players or to at least provide contractual provisions 
that enable the players to overcome any incentive incompatibilities.60
2.2 Hypothesis of Reaction to the Brazilian Legal Framework
The aim of this Section is to predict how sponsors, under the current legal 
framework described above in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 and in light of the tools of agency 
theory discussed in Section 2.1 above, would write their contracts, particularly with 
regards to the governance rules of EFPCs.
58 See Kristen V. Campana, Paying our Own Way: the Privatization of the Chilean Social Security System 
and its Lessons for American Reform 20 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 385, 402 (1999).
59 See Steve Idemoto, Pension Privatization in Britain: A Boon to the Finance Industry, a Boondoggle to 
Workers, 2000 ECON. OPPORTUNITY INST., available at http://www.econop.org/SocialSecurity/SS-
SocialInsecurityBritain.htm.
60 Compare to JUAN YERMO & ANNAMARIA MAROSSY, supra note 32. 
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It is necessary to make three initial observations in order to make a coherent 
analysis of the governance of Brazilian pension funds (EFPCs).  First, the formal contract 
between sponsors, managers and participants is the by-laws of the pension funds.  
Sponsors have sole responsibility for writing such documents, as long as they respect the 
legal provisions and limitations.  They have no obligation to listen to or ask for inputs 
from employees.  Once the by-laws are written, they must be approved by the 
Complementary Pension System Secretariat (Secretaria de Previdência 
Complementar).61
Second, Brazilian regulation makes no distinction between the entities that offer 
defined benefit plans and the entities that offer defined contribution plans, despite the fact 
that such plans have totally different contractual and incentive structures.  In fact, 
virtually all the pension funds that comprise the sample of empirical research described in 
Part III of this paper offer both defined contribution and defined benefit plans, and they 
also often offer mixed plans which are comprised of a defined benefit part and a defined 
contribution part.       
Third, as mentioned before, participants are the residual claimants in the Brazilian 
pension funds contractual structure.  They are the ones who ultimately bear the risk in the 
event that the pension fund becomes insolvent.    
The hypothesis stated below as to how sponsors write pension funds’ by-laws 
relies upon two assumptions.  First, the hypothesis assumes that all sponsors’ choices are 
driven by their self-interest.  Therefore, whenever sponsors have a choice between two or
more ways to act, it is assumed that they will pick the one that maximizes their utility and 
minimizes monitoring.  Second, the hypothesis assumes that sponsors will comply with 
61
 Lei Complementar No. 109, de 29 de Maio de 2001, D.O.U. de 30.05.2001, art. 33.
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the law.  Therefore, in writing the by-laws of pension funds, the sponsor will only attempt 
to control the decision making process or to otherwise maximize their utility when the 
law does not impose the opposite.  
Considering the observations and assumptions above, it is reasonable to say that 
sponsors will write the by-laws of the pension funds in compliance with the minimum 
requirements imposed by law and in a way that gives them as much power as possible 
over the decisions of the entity so that the decisions of the pension fund maximize their 
interests.  Furthermore, they will only give to participants the minimum powers required 
by law and they will embrace more control power whenever they have an opportunity to 
do so.  The exact dimension of this hypothesis in relation to each of the aspects of the 
Brazilian pension funds’ governance structure analyzed in the empirical research 
described in Part III is further detailed below.    
2.2.1 Management Structure
Management structure is the formal arrangement an organization has set up in 
order to make policy decisions, to set a long-term direction for the firm and to manage 
financial decisions. 
As explained in Section 1.2 above, Brazilian law sets forth a mandatory three tier 
structure including: (1) a conselho deliberativo (a deliberative council); (2) a diretoria 
executiva (executive officers); and (3) a conselho fiscal (a fiscal council).   The first two 
bodies have managerial functions, while the third one has a monitoring function. Since 
this research focuses on the decision-making process, the analysis of by-laws conducted 
in the empirical sections focuses on the features of the conselho deliberativo (deliberative 
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council) and diretoria executiva (executive officers). There is not apparent reason for by-
laws to change this structure in order to ensure control of the sponsors over pension funds 
decision. That said, with regards to the management structure, the hypothesis is that, in 
compliance with the law, all the pension funds will adopt two management bodies: (i) a 
conselho deliberativo – deliberative council; and (ii) a diretoria executiva – executive 
officers.     
2.2.2 Composition of the Management Bodies
As mentioned above, the by-laws of pension funds sponsored by private entities 
must demand that at least one third of the deliberative council is composed of employees 
of the fund.  Publicly-sponsored pension funds are faced with a more detailed set of 
governance rules including that the proportion of participants’ representatives is one half 
and the members of the deliberative council are non-removable.
Under agency theory assumptions, one would predict that sponsors will respect 
the minimum representation of participants in the management bodies as required by law 
but they will not include more than is required.  Moreover, whenever the law permits, 
they will implement mechanisms that empower the sponsors’ control power and weaken 
the participants’ control power.  
Therefore, the composition of the deliberative councils of pension funds will 
likely be as follows: (i) one third of the deliberative council of pension funds sponsored 
by private companies will be participants’ representatives; and (ii) one half of the 
deliberative council of pension funds sponsored by public companies will be participants’ 
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representatives, however sponsors will keep tie breaker powers, in compliance with the 
law.
The executive officers of pension funds will likely be as follows: (i) executive 
officers of pension funds sponsored by private companies will be either appointed 
directly by the sponsor or by the deliberative council (in which the majority of two thirds 
of the members are appointed by the sponsor), and these officers will be removable; (ii) 
executive officers of pension funds sponsored by public companies will be either 
appointed directly by the sponsor or by the deliberative council (in which the sponsor has 
tie breaker powers), and these officers will be removable; and (iii) as there is no legal 
minimum requirement of participant representation, the proportion of participant 
representatives among executive officers will significantly drop if compared to the same 
number in relation  to deliberative councils or simply will not exist.    
2.2.3 Requirements for the Members of the Management Bodies
The Brazilian law sets forth that the individuals to be appointed to the deliberative 
council must (1) have previously participated in financial, management or accounting 
activities; (2) not have been convicted of any crime; and (3) not have been convicted in 
any administrative process for violation of the regulations set by the social security 
system or for any other infractions as a public employee.  In addition to these 
requirements, a graduate degree (in any discipline) is required of executive officers. 
The former of these requirements relates to a material characteristic, but it is 
rather ample.  The latter two requirements are pretty formal.  Therefore, it is possible to 
say that the legal requirements provide both sponsors and participants with a lot of 
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flexibility to appoint whoever they want to the management bodies, as long as this person 
has some experience in finance, management or accounting.  As this flexibility is 
desirable from an agency theory perspective, the hypothesis is that the by-laws will either 
adopt the requirements imposed by law or will impose new requirements that limit those 
individuals in the management bodies to those individuals under the sponsor’s control or 
influence who will therefore be more likely to succumb to the sponsor’s pressure.   
Part III describes the empirical research conducted, the findings of the research 
and compares the findings with the predictions above.
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3. RULES OF GOVERNANCE IN PENSION FUNDS’ BY-LAWS
This Section presents the findings of the empirical research conducted on the by-
laws of Brazilian pension funds, whose description of the methodology and main results 
are in Appendix I.  It also compares such findings to the hypotheses described in Section 
2.2 above and with the theoretical contractual optimal structures described in Section 2.1.   
3.1 Management Structure
All the pension funds of the sample comply with the minimum requirement 
established by the law with regards to the structure (see Table A below).  More than 93% 
of the sample adopts exactly the management structure proscribed by law which is to 
have two management bodies (deliberative council and executive officers).  Two of the 
multi-sponsored pension funds, corresponding to 6.6% of the sample, in addition to the 
minimum structure, adopt a third body which aggregates all the sponsors.
Table A 
Law Compliance
Percentage of Compliance
Law Requirement Pension Funds Sponsored 
by Public Entities
Pension Funds Sponsored 
by Private Entities
Total
2 management bodies 100% 100% 100%
1/3 of the participants representatives 
in the deliberative council 
100% 86.66% 93.33%
deliberative council with powers to 
elect the executive officers
86% - 86.66%
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The most interesting finding of the analysis of the management structure, 
however, is not with regards to the number of bodies, but, rather, in regards to the 
functions of these bodies, which is also established by the bylaws. The traditional model 
of two tier management assumes a hierarchically-higher body, generally called the board 
of directors, whose members are elected by the principals. 62  This hierarchically-higher 
body is responsible for the task of determining the entity’s policies and main business 
decisions.  This higher body is normally a collective decision body, whose members have 
no or very little power when acting as individuals.  The members of this body are not 
involved in the day-to-day administration but they set the limits and goals to be pursued 
by the ones responsible for it.  This body participates in business affairs of the entity 
through its selection of the chief executive officer and other executive officers, and to 
some extent through the exercise of other functions, including oversight, establishment of 
compensation levels, and perhaps approval of major transactions.  Therefore, one of the 
main functions of this body is to elect and remove the member of the second body who 
will be in charge of the day-to-day decisions.  
The members of the second body are commonly called executive officers.  In 
theory, officers carry out the day-to-day affairs of the entity subject to guidance and 
control of the board of directors.  In fact, the authority of the officer in relation to 
business decisions is considerably greater, as directors are hardly ever consulted for 
decisions of the day-to-day business of the entity. The role of directors in virtually all 
62This is the typical structure of corporations in America and in Brazil.  The management structure of 
corporations is comprised of a board of directors and officers.  The board of directors is a collective-
decision body entrusted with powers to approve the main business decisions and to establish the policies of 
the corporation while the officers, who are elected and removed by the directors, are in charge of the day-
to-day business decision.  See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 255-257 (West Publishing Co. ed., 
4th ed. 1997) (1982).
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day-to-day business affairs is to approve the respective financial statements.  Therefore, 
they are almost never involved in business decisions.  Some might disagree because the 
officers approve the financial statements, but this happens after the business decision is 
already made and implemented.  Since the power over business decisions of the board of 
directors is reduced, the board’s main responsibility is to elect the executive officers.
This function is particularly important in Brazil because there is a fundamental 
difference in the management structure of corporations.  In America, at least formally, the 
board of directors of a corporation is the central management authority.  All corporate 
power and authority flows from the board to the other bodies of the corporation, 
including to the executive officers, and therefore, the board has the power to bind the 
corporation. In Brazil, the board of directors of a corporation is the hierarchally-higher 
body that appoints the officers but not all the powers of the officers are granted by the 
board as some of them are statutory.  For instance, the officers have the exclusive power 
to bind the corporation.  While officers may need the board’s approval for certain 
transactions, the capacity of representing and binding the corporation is exclusively held 
by the officers.63 As in Brazil, some of the powers are traditionally reserved for the 
officers, the board of directors has limited powers so the election and removal of the 
officers becomes even more important.64
Considering that the deliberative council of pension funds plays the role of the 
hierarchically-higher body (board of directors) in the model described above, that the 
executive officers of pension funds are the executive officers, and that the law imposes 
only a minority compulsory presence of participant representatives in the composition of 
63 See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, Capítulo XII.
64 See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, supra note 62, at 255-257.            
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the deliberative council, it is clear that participants have limited influence over business 
decisions.  
In addition, for a significant part of the Brazilian pension funds analyzed, this 
typical structure has been changed in a way that further weakens the power of the 
deliberative council.  With regards to privately sponsored pension funds, where the law 
does not provide minimum functions for the deliberative councils, 8 out of 15 (53.33%) 
entities had their by-laws drafted in a way that the function of electing the executive 
officers was transferred from the deliberative council to the sponsor.  In these funds, the 
sponsor is directly responsible for appointing the officers (see Appendix I, Findings –
Analysis).  Therefore, for most of the privately sponsored pension funds, the deliberative 
council has been stripped of its main power.  
This is also seen in the pension funds sponsored by public entities, in relation to 
which the law expressed set forth that the deliberative council should be the body with 
power to elect the executive officers (see Section 1.2 above).  5 out of 15 of these (33%) 
pension funds put the sponsor in charge of appointing the managers (2 out of 15—
13.33%) of or have separate elections for the executive officers elected by the sponsors’ 
representative and those elected by the participants’ representative, provided that the 
chief executive officers and financial officers are elected by the sponsor representatives 
(3 out of 15—20%).         
The by-laws of pension funds may reduce the discretion of the deliberative 
council in other ways.  For instance, in the pension fund Economus, the deliberative 
council is the management body responsible for appointing the officers.  However, the 
deliberative council must pick the names of the officers from a list prepared by the 
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sponsor.  Therefore, although one might argue that technically the by-laws give the 
deliberative council the choice among the sponsor’s appointees since the council has the 
ultimate decision, it is difficult to believe that those individuals on the sponsor’s list are 
not somehow linked to the sponsor’s interests, and are, therefore, under the sponsor’s 
sphere of influence.        
 To sum up, although the two tier structure set forth by law is respected by 
sponsors in drafting pension funds’ by-laws, other mechanisms are frequently used to 
reduce the functions, responsibilities and powers of the deliberative council, a body in 
which participants’ representatives have seats.  The transfer of power to elect the 
executive officers from the deliberative council to the sponsor is a particularly common 
method of reducing the deliberative council’s power.
3.2 Composition of the Management Bodies
The findings of the empirical research on the composition of the management 
bodies differ slightly from the hypothesis posed in Section 2.4 above.  However, they are 
not incompatible with rational behavior under agency theory principals and assumptions 
since the sponsors, in writing the by-laws, found a different way to manifest their rational 
behavior from an economic point of view.  Table B below summarizes the findings with 
regards to the average proportion of participants’ representatives in the management 
bodies of the pension funds analyzed.
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Table B
Composition of the Management Bodies
Pension Funds 
Sponsored by 
Private Entities 
Percentage
Required by law
Pension Funds 
Sponsored by 
Public Entities
Percentage
Required by law
Participants’ 
representatives in the 
deliberative council
37.47% 33.33% 50% 50%
Participants’ 
representatives as 
executive officers
5% to 9.9% - 7.7% to 41.11% -
With regards to pension funds sponsored by private companies, the findings show 
that 13 out of 15 of those entities (86.66%) comply with the regulation regarding the 
composition of the deliberative council (see Table A above).  In relation to the remaining 
2 pension funds, less than one third of the representatives of the deliberative councils, 
however, are participants’ representatives as it is required by law.  
Unlike the predictions, 5 out of 15 of the privately sponsored pension funds 
(33.33%) have more participants’ representatives in their deliberative council than they 
are required to have by law.  Participants’ representatives, however, do not make up a 
majority of any of the deliberative councils of these funds.  More importantly, all of the 
by-laws of these five pension funds take from their respective deliberative councils the 
power to elect the executive officers.  In other words, sponsors wrote the by-laws to give 
participants’ greater representation than required by law, but took from the deliberative 
council its most important power, as explained in Section 3.1 above.   
Due to this quite innocuous over-representation, the average proportion of 
participants’ representatives in deliberative councils among the sample of pension funds 
sponsored by private entities is 37.47%.  This number is 4.13% greater than required by 
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the law.  Table C below shows the correlation between the composition of the 
deliberative council and the power to elect the executive officers.  Interestingly, on the 
one hand, pension funds which by-laws give to the deliberative council the power to elect 
the executive officer, in average, have in these bodies fewer seats to participants’ 
representatives than the minimum required by law.  On the other hand, when the function 
of electing the executive officer is allocated to the sponsor or sponsors and participants 
elect their representatives among the executive officers separately, more seats in the 
deliberative councils are reserved to participants’ representatives in average.  This data 
provides evidence that the sponsors in drafting pension funds by-laws tend to give more 
seats to participants when deliberative councils are weak bodies, and less seats when the 
deliberative councils have power to elect the executive officers. 
Table C
Composition of the Deliberative Council Correlated to the Power of Electing the 
Executive Officers – Pension Funds Sponsored by Private Entities
Allocation of powers to elect the 
executive officer
Representati
veness in 
relation to 
the sample
Actual 
proportion of 
participants’ 
representatives in 
the deliberative 
council
Minimum 
percentage  
of 
participants 
required by 
law
Under or over 
compliance
Deliberative council 26% 26.43% 33.33% - 6.8%
Under compliance
Sponsor 53% 40.57% 33.33% 7.24%
Over compliance
Separate elections – 1 officer 
appointed by the participants and 
3 appointed by the sponsor
20% 41.63% 33.33% 8.3%
Over compliance
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When analyzing the executive officers the representation of participants drops 
drastically. The average proportion of participants’ representatives who are executive 
officers varies between 5% and 9.9%.  This variance is caused by the 5 pension funds 
(33.33%) that have 100% of their executive officers appointed by the deliberative 
council.  These deliberative councils are partially composed of participants’ 
representatives but the decision in this body is made collectively by the majority of the 
members.  Therefore, even though the participants are represented, they might not have 
much influence over the election of the officer since they have a minority representation 
(average of 37.47%).  As it is impossible to determine exactly how influential are the 
participants’ representatives in the election of the executive officers, these percentages 
represent a range of power that varies from 0 (no power as a result of the majority 
system) to 37.47% (as the participants’ representatives were able to elect the same 
proportion of executive officers as the proportion of representatives in the deliberative 
council).  
With regards to pension funds sponsored by public companies, the findings show 
that 100% of these entities are in compliance with the law (see Table A above).  
Therefore, the ratio of participation of participants’ representatives to sponsors’ 
representatives in deliberative councils is 1:1.  However, due to the tie break power given 
to the sponsors’ representatives and different arrangements in the by-laws of these 
entities, the proportion of participants’ representatives who are executive officers varies 
between 7.7% and 41.11%.  This variance is caused by the 10 pension funds (66.66%) 
that have 100% of their executive officers appointed by the deliberative council, from 
which the president is appointed by the sponsor and has tie-breaker powers.  
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Even though participants and sponsors are equally represented in the deliberative 
council, participants might not have much influence over the election of officers since the 
president has the power to decide in the event of a tie.  Again, as it is impossible to 
determine exactly how influential are the participants’ representatives in the election of 
the executive officers, these percentages represent a range of power that varies from 0 (no 
power as a result of the tie breaker vote of the president of the council) to 50% (as the 
participants’ representatives in the deliberative council were able to elect executive 
officers in exact proportion to their participation in such body).  
The analysis of the structures described above, both of privately and publicly 
sponsored pension funds, demonstrates very high agency costs.  This contradicts Eugene 
Fama’s and Michael Jensen’s65 optimal structure for the management of pension funds, 
since the decisions are not made by the bearers of the residual risks of the organization.  
In addition, theoretically, in organizations that are managed by individuals who are not 
the sole residual claimants and who therefore do not fully bear the financial consequences 
of their decisions, it is important for the residual claimants to retain decision control 
rights over the management by maintaining the right to hire, fire, and set the 
compensation of the managers.  Therefore, it would be necessary for participants to have 
control over the managers.  As shown by the findings, this is not the case in Brazil.  
No matter what kind of plan is adopted (defined benefit or defined contribution), 
participants of Brazilian pension funds bear insolvency risk and sponsors design the 
management structure and control the investment and management decisions.  Moreover, 
participants have no control rights, since in all cases they only have a minority voting 
power making it difficult to achieve their goals.  Therefore, under an agency cost 
65 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, supra note 56, at 327-349.
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analysis, the structures of Brazilian pension funds are highly inefficient.
This theoretical analysis suggests that one way to reduce agency costs and to 
mitigate sponsors’ influence over investment and management decisions of pension 
funds, would be to ensure that fund boards have a majority of participant-elected 
members.66
However, empirical research done by R. Romano with public pension funds in the 
USA suggests that a wholly-workers-elected board is not necessary, and questions 
whether a specified proportion of elected members is optimal.67  On the contrary, the 
performance of the pension funds improved as elected members were added to a board, 
but declined once they made up a critical mass of the board.68 If this is generally true, the 
Brazilian governance system in pension funds should be adequate, since the law requires 
pension funds to have some level of participants’ representation and most of the pension 
funds comply with the law.   On the other hand, the scandals and illegal behavior 
described in Section 1.4 provide evidence that the system is somehow inadequate.  
Something must be wrong with the system if such incidents occur.    
This same research also found evidence that non-elected members have a greater 
ability to influence investment decisions when there is a greater number of elected 
66 Moreover, some commentators believe that defined contribution plans would be a socially preferable 
structure for a pension system. Those scholars believe that the egalitarian goals of the socialist vision are 
more compatible with defined contribution plans. In their opinion, public insurance arrangements for 
defined benefit plans are prone to unfair cross-subsidization of different classes of workers and a system 
limited to defined contribution plans would still produce inequality since less successful funds would have 
lower returns than more successful ones. However, in such a system the high returns would be less socially 
concentrated and less correlated with other dimensions of a social position than they would be in a defined 
benefit system. See William H. Simon, The Prospects of Pension Fund Socialism, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 251, 255-256 (1993).
67 See Roberta Romano, supra note 1, at 840-842.
68 See William H. Simon, supra note 66, at 260-266 (discussing the potential conflicts between the 
diverging interests possessed by workers in different positions within the pension funds).
45
Thesis - Luciana Dias - US.doc
members who have less investment experience than other members.69  If this were the 
case in Brazil, structural protections could be adopted to limit problems that would result 
from having financially inexperienced participants’ representatives on the board. R. 
Romano suggests, for instance, that the law could require that all or some number of 
elected board members meet minimum expertise requirements, or that the government 
could provide board members with rudimentary financial training. Also, the government 
could establish advisory councils composed of individuals with investment expertise to 
provide recommendations to fund boards concerning investment strategy.  However, in 
the Brazilian case, the participants’ representatives’ lack of experience in management 
and finance do not seem to be the only reason for these individuals to follow the 
sponsors’ representatives’ opinions.  As explained in Section 3.3 below, the Brazilian 
legal framework allows the sponsor to draft the by-laws of pension funds in a way that 
enables the sponsors to give their own officers, employees, agents, or other 
representatives positions as managers.   These individuals will have fiduciary or 
contractual duties towards the sponsor which means the sponsors have a strong influence 
over their decisions.   
Another argument that is often used to highlight the problems and limits of 
employee control over pension funds boards is the fact that employees have diverse 
interests so conflicts may arise among various subgroups.70  For example, a potential 
conflict of interest exists between senior and junior workers.   Senior and junior workers 
tend to have different interests and perspectives from each other.   Senior workers are 
often more intensely concerned with the preservation and enhancement of retirement 
69Roberta Romano, supra note 1, at 842.
70 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, Erisa's Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1120-1126 (1988); see also William H. Simon, supra note 66, at 259-266.
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benefits while young employees are often more concerned with the long-term prospects 
of the pension fund.  Similarly, participants often disagree on the choice between 
retirement security and employment security.  For instance, retirees face no tradeoff 
between pension benefits and employment compensation. From their perspective, 
pension benefits always prevail, even though some current workers might lose their jobs 
as a result. The same is not true for younger employees. Not only do they have less 
wealth tied up in the pension plan, but they also are more concerned with keeping their 
jobs than with their pension benefits.71
Another possible hypothesis for the failing in the system of participants’ 
representation in the Brazilian case is the process by which the participants’ 
representatives are elected.  The findings suggest that the most significant part of the 
election process of participants’ representatives is controlled either by the sponsor or by 
the pension fund. There is no guarantee that regulation of this process will ensure that the 
sponsor or the pension fund does not influence the result of the election or the 
participants’ voting decisions.  It is therefore necessary to conduct empirical research on 
the election process of the participants’ representatives to find out whether it is adequate.
Therefore, before suggesting an increase in the number of participants’ 
representatives in the board of Brazilian pension funds as a mechanism to minimize 
agency costs, it is necessary to further investigate the reasons for the inadequacy of the 
current structure, what other measures would be necessary to guarantee that the 
representatives of the participants were indeed advocates of the participants’ interests in 
this body and what other problems such reforms could cause. 
71
 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, supra note 70, at 1120.
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3.3 Requirements for the Members of the Management Bodies
Section 2 above explains that the requirements set forth by Brazilian law in 
relation to the qualification of the members of the management body are either formal or 
excessively vague.  As a result, unless otherwise established in the by-laws of the pension 
funds, the legal requirements provide both sponsors and participants with a lot of 
flexibility as to who they want to elect to the management bodies.  As this flexibility is 
desirable from an agency theory perspective, one can expect that the by-laws will adopt 
either only the requirements imposed by law or will impose new requirements that limit 
the occupancy of the positions in the management bodies to people under the sponsor’s 
control.  
This rule allows the sponsor to draft the by-laws of pension funds in a way that 
enables sponsors to have their own officers, employees, agents, or other representative 
serve as managers.  Sponsors routinely exercise this authority as showed in the findings.  
For instance, virtually all the by-laws require the managers to be either participants or 
employees of the sponsor.  Moreover, some of them require that the managers of the 
sponsors keep at the same time the functions of the manager of the pension fund.   For 
example, the CEO of Banco Itaú, the sponsor of Fundação Itaubanco which is the fourth 
largest privately sponsored pension fund in Brazil, is also the president of the deliberative 
council of the fund.  This individual owes fiduciary duties to both entities.
The problem in electing these individuals is that they frequently owe either 
contractual or fiduciary duties to the sponsor.  The individuals that perform management 
functions in both the sponsor’s enterprise and the respective pension fund owe fiduciary 
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duties to both entities.72 Individuals that perform management functions in the pension 
fund and some other function in the sponsor’s enterprise are under a contractual 
relationship (employment agreement) that which means the sponsor has some power over 
the manager of the pension fund.   The fact that the managers of the pension funds are 
also individuals that have contractual or fiduciary obligations in relation to the sponsor 
creates an obvious tension with these individuals’ duties.  In other words, these rules 
permit funds to have non-neutral managers, rather than insisting upon neutral employee-
chosen fiduciaries or upon a wholly independent fiduciary (chosen, for example, in the 
manner of an arbitrator). 
Not only does this legal framework create a conflicting situation for the manager 
of pension funds, but it also allows the sponsors to compromise the managers’ of the 
pension funds loyalty for the satisfaction of their professional interests.  For example, an 
elected participant representative may think that the position he takes on the pension 
fund’s decisions involving the sponsor’s interests will impact his future promotions and 
wage increases, either because such a representative expressly was told so by his 
superiors or because the sponsor signaled this by favoring the participants’ 
representatives who support the sponsor’s interests and punishing those who take 
positions against the sponsor’s interests. 
72 Directors and officers of corporations in Brazil have a statutory fiduciary duty towards the company and 
its shareholders. Lei No. 6404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976: “[a]rticle 154. An officer shall use the powers 
conferred upon him by law and by the by-laws to achieve the corporation corporate purposes and to its best 
interests the public at large and the social role of the corporation. 
Paragraph 1. An officer elected by a group or class of shareholders shall have the same duties toward the 
corporation as the other officers and shall not fail to fulfill such duties, even at the expense of the interests 
of those who elected him. (…) 
Article 155. An officer shall serve the corporation with loyalty, shall treat its affairs with confidence and 
shall not: (…) II - fail to exercise or protect corporation rights or, in seeking to obtain advantages for 
himself or for a third party, fail to make use of a commercial opportunity which he knows to be of interest 
to the corporation.”
49
Thesis - Luciana Dias - US.doc
In the simplest scenario, a decision will involve a choice between the opposing 
interests of the sponsors and of the pension funds’ participants.  However, some of these 
decisions will involve the managers’ own set of interests and sometimes managers may 
see advantages in siding with either the sponsor or participants. In that sense, it is 
important to remember that the sponsor hires and can fire these managers and controls 
their promotions, increases in wages and other incentives that may lead the managers to 
take the sponsors’ side. As a result, it is reasonable to believe that, facing a conflicting 
decision; managers would prefer to vote in support of the sponsors’ interests rather than 
in support of the participants’ interests.
By-laws of some of the pension funds contain clauses that prohibit remuneration 
to the manager which shows that the workers’ representatives have more incentives to act 
in accordance with the sponsor’s interests rather than in accordance with the participants’ 
interests.  Further, these clauses establish that any of the managers’ efforts and time spent 
on the performance of their responsibilities as managers of the pension fund will be 
considered efforts and energies devoted and time consumed in rendering services to the 
sponsor.  While it is not possible to determine exactly how common this practice is since 
most of the pension funds do not have a compensation provision in their by-laws, at least 
3 of the pension funds sponsored by private entities, which corresponds to 10% of the 
whole sample, do this.             
In conclusion, the dual fiduciary obligation faced by the managers of the sponsor 
that are also managers of the pension fund, or the conflicting position of the employees 
that are managers of the pension fund and have an employment agreement, indeed appear 
to contrast markedly with the supposed duty of exclusive loyalty to the participants of 
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pension funds imposed by agency theory principals.  To resolve this problem, the 
Brazilian legislature should rethink the current structure and try to find mechanisms that 
could guarantee a more neutral and independent management for the pension entities.73
73
 The literature on independent directors in corporations provides useful background information on this 
topic.  See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director -- Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 597 (1982); see also Richard E. Gutman, Requirements of Independent Directors 657 PLI/Comm 205 
(1993); see also Stephen M. Brainbrigde, Independent Directors and ALI Corporate Governance Project, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034 (1993).
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CONCLUSION
This work draws both theoretical and empirical conclusions.  From a theoretical 
standpoint, it shows that Brazilian law on governance of pension funds allows the 
sponsors (employers) to write the contract (by-laws) that will regulate the relationships 
between themselves, the managers and the participants (employees) within the 
organization.  Further, assuming that sponsors behave as self-interested players who aim 
to maximize their own welfare, this thesis predicts that sponsors will write the contracts 
of pension funds (by-laws) to minimize monitoring and to maximize control over 
business decisions to the greatest extent permitted by law.  Moreover, it demonstrates that 
the Brazilian legal framework forces participants to take on the risk of failure of the 
pension fund.  
An agency theory analysis of this legal framework suggests that it is inefficient in 
many ways.  In organizations managed by individuals that are not the sole residual 
claimants, control rights (right to hire, fire and set compensation) should be retained by 
whoever bears the financial consequences of decisions within organization.  This is not 
the case for pension funds in Brazil.  On the one hand, while sponsors have the authority 
to determine who will have control power over the management and investment decisions 
of the pension fund, the sponsors do not bear the residual risks of the organization.  On 
the other hand, participants have very limited control rights over pension funds, but they 
bear the residual claim of the organization. Decision rights and residual risks are 
inefficiently allocated within the organization.
The second set of conclusions comes from the empirical research conducted. To 
ensure that the sponsors exercise the authority granted by law - writing the by-laws in a 
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way that they keep control over the management and investment decisions of pension 
funds - the governance provisions in the by-laws of 30 Brazilian pension funds were 
examined.  The criteria used in choosing the sample studied was the amount of 
investment assets and these 30 pension funds comprise approximately 76% of the total 
number of pension funds in Brazil. 
The empirical evidence reported in this thesis confirms the predictions as it 
demonstrates that sponsors write the governance clauses of pension funds by-laws in a 
way to maximize control over business decisions to the greatest extent permitted by law. 
The findings showed that various mechanisms are used by sponsors to reduce the 
functions, responsibilities and power of the deliberative council, a body in which 
participants’ representatives have seats.  Particularly, sponsors draft the by-laws in such a 
way to limit the power of the deliberative council by limiting the council’s ability to elect 
the executive officers and managers in charge of the day-to-day administration of the 
pension fund.  
The findings also demonstrate that participants’ representation in the deliberative 
council is generally fairly significant but participants’ representatives are never the 
majority. However, it the participants’ representation drastically drops in relation to the 
executive officers.  The findings suggest that this number can be as low as 5% in pension 
funds sponsored by private entities and 7.7% in pension funds sponsored by public 
entities.  This fact, combined with the reduction of power of deliberative council 
highlighted above, demonstrates that participants have very limited influence over the 
governance of pension funds.       
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Finally, there is evidence that most by-laws require that the members of the 
administrative bodies are either employees of the sponsor or the participants which means 
that most members are employees of the sponsor.  The problem in electing employees of 
the sponsor as managers of the pension fund is that they owe contractual or fiduciary 
duties to the sponsor, which creates an obvious tension.  The managers of the pension 
funds are, as a rule, non-neutral and therefore they constantly face conflicts of interests.
As a general conclusion, all these problems suggest that a debate would be 
worthwhile to discuss how to best reform this structure of pension funds’ governance in 
Brazil both for the sake of the workers that currently participate in the system and also for 
the public employees that will soon be integrated to it as a result of the recent 
constitutional amendments.   
Before evaluating all of the possible proposals it is necessary to theoretically and 
empirically evaluate many other issues.  For instance, in considering the suggestion that 
an increase in the number seats for participants’ representatives would reduce agency 
costs, it is necessary to assess what factors would ensure a fair and independent election 
of these representatives.  It would be necessary to consider what kind of qualifications, 
protections and duties the law would have to give to these individuals in order to ensure 
that they act in the best interests of the participants.  Similarly, in considering the use of a 
trustee or intermediary to aid the communication between the sponsors and participants, 
it is necessary to discuss the agency problems that would arise as a result of this new 
player and to consider how this new player would increase the administrative costs of the 
pension funds.    
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  This thesis demonstrates that the current system is theoretically and empirically 
inefficient and problematic but it also acknowledges that further research is necessary 
before any concrete proposals can be made.  The findings and conclusions reached by 
this thesis are only a first step for the discussion; nevertheless, this thesis shows that any 
reform proposal should take into consideration the agency problems discussed above, 
matching incentives, control powers and risk allocation.
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APPENDIX I
I. THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
1. The sample 
The Research adopts a non-probability sampling method74. The sampling criteria 
was: (i) magnitude, measured by the total value of the investment assets of each pension 
fund, and (ii) the nature of the sponsor, public or private entity.  The initial sample for 
pension funds sponsored by private entities includes the 15 largest entities of this kind, 
according to the data made available in the rankings published by the Secretaria de 
Previdência Complementar do Ministério da Previdência Social on January 28, 200575.  
However, since information on the funds classified as number 7 (HSBC), number 12 
(Previ –GM), number 14 (PPS-Philips), and number 18 (VWPP) could not be found, they 
were replaced by number 16 (Elos), 17 (Fundação Attílio Francisco Xavier Fontana) and 
19 (Fibra). The initial sample pension funds sponsored by public entities includes the 15 
largest entities of this kind, according to the data made available in the rankings 
published by the Secretaria de Previdência Complementar do Ministério da Previdência 
Social on January 28, 200576.  However, since information on the fund classified as 
number 14 (CAPEF) could not be found, it was replaced by number 16 (Ceres).
As this research does not adopt any of the probability sampling methods, it is not 
possible to extend the results of this empirical research for the whole population of 
74
 Probability methods generally use statistical random selection and aim at creating a representative sample 
which contains the same variations that exist in the actual population.
75 Ranking de Investimentos das EFPC - Posição em 28 de janeiro de 2005, avaliable at 
http://www.previdencia.gov.br/spc/docs/ranking_de_Invest_EFPCs_em_28_01_05.pdf.
76 Ranking de Investimentos das EFPC - Posição em 28 de janeiro de 2005, avaliable at 
http://www.previdencia.gov.br/spc/docs/ranking_de_Invest_EFPCs_em_28_01_05.pdf.
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Brazilian pension funds. However, the sample represents 39.88% of the whole population 
if the number of beneficiaries is considered and 76.13% of the whole population if the 
investment assets value is considered.
2. Observations in Relation to the Sources and Coding
All the bylaws analyzed were downloaded from the respective pension fund or its 
sponsor’s website in February 2005.
All the statistical data was collected from official documents made available by 
the Secretaria de Previdência Complementar do Ministério da Previdência Social (the 
Complementary Pension System Secretariat), a governmental body linked to Ministério 
de Previdência Social (Social Security Ministry).
Information regarding the structure, size and appointment of the members of the 
management bodies of the pension funds were the primary data collected when coding.  
II. FINDINGS –  ANALYSIS
1. Size
a. Pension funds sponsored by private companies:
• The size of the Deliberative Council averaged 8.13, with a range of 5 to 18.  
• The number of the Executive Officers in public pension funds averaged 3.8, with 
a range of 3 to 5. 
b. Pension funds sponsored by public companies:
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• The size of the Deliberative Council averaged 6 members, with no range –all the 
pension funds had a Deliberative Council made up of 6 members.   
• The number of the Executive Officers in public pension funds averaged 3.7, with 
a range of 3 to 6. 
2. Term of office
a. Pension funds sponsored by private companies:
• The term of office of the member of the Deliberative Council averaged 3.14 
years, with a range of 2 to 5.  
• The term of office of the Executive Officers averaged 3.16 years, with a range of 
1 to 4. 
b. Pension funds sponsored by public companies:
• All the terms of office of the member of the Deliberative Council are 4 years.  
• The term of office of the Executive Officers averaged 3.35 years, with a range of 
1 to 5.77
3. Removability 
a. Pension funds sponsored by private companies:
• In 14 out of 15 pension funds (93.33%), the members of the Deliberative Council 
are removable at any time during the term of the office. 1 out of 15 pension funds 
77
 One of the pension funds has an indeterminate term for their officers.
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(6.66%) guarantees non-resolvability to the members of the Deliberative Council 
elected by participants during the term of the office78.  
• In 100% of the pension funds, Executive Officers can be removed at any time.79
b. Pension funds sponsored by public companies:
• In 14 out of 15 pension funds (93.33%), the members of the Deliberative Council 
are not removable. 1 out of 15 pension funds (6.66%) allows for members of the 
Deliberative Council appointed by the sponsors to be removed at any time.  
• In 100% of the pension funds, Executive Officers can be removed at any time.
4. Composition
a. Pension funds sponsored by private companies:
• deliberative councils: the average proportion of participants’ representatives in 
deliberative councils is 37.47%, therefore the average proportion of sponsors’ 
representatives is 62.53%.
• executive officers: the average proportion of participants’ representatives in 
executive officers varies between 5% and 9.9%, therefore the average proportion 
of sponsors’ representatives varies between 90.1% and 95%.
i. 8 out of 15 pension funds (53.33%) have 100% of their Executive 
Officers appointed directly by the sponsor. 
78
 Since Brazilian law does not prohibit the removal of members of the Deliberative Council, whenever the 
by- laws did not state whether it was possible to remove the members of the Deliberative Council at any 
time or not, it was assumed that it was possible to remove them at any time.
79
 Since Brazilian law does not prohibit the removal of  Executive Officers, whenever the by-laws did not 
state whether it was possible to remove the Executive Officers at any time or not, it was considered that it 
was possible to remove them at any time.
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ii. out of 15 pension funds (26.66%) have 100% of their Executive 
Officers appointed by the Deliberative Council.
iii. 3 out of 15 pension funds (20%) have 25% of their Executive Officers 
appointed directly by the participants and 75% of their Executive 
Officers appointed directly by the sponsor. 
b. Pension funds sponsored by public companies:
• deliberative councils: the average proportion of participants’ representatives in 
Deliberative Councils is 50%, therefore the average proportion of sponsors’ 
representatives is 50%.
• executive officers: the proportion of participants’ representatives in the executive 
officers varies between 7.77% and 41.11%, therefore the average proportion of 
sponsors’ representatives varies between 58.88% and 95.55%.
5. Other Observations in Relation to the Information Collected
• Virtually all the pension funds of the sample offered both defined contribution 
and defined benefit plans, and the vast majority offered, in addition, hybrid plans 
comprised partially by a defined contribution and partially by defined benefit.
• All the pension funds are also sponsors of the pension funds; this means that the 
employees of the pension funds are also its participants.
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APPENDIX II
REPRESENTATIVENESS SHEET
1. Important Figures
• Total of beneficiaries of pension funds in Brazil: 2,388,646.80
• Total of pension funds in Brazil: 358 entities in July 2004.81
• Pension funds sponsored by private entities are responsible for approximately 
60.06% of this number and pension funds sponsored by public entities are 
responsible for approximately 39.93% of the total amount of beneficiaries.
• Total of the investment assets of pension funds in Brazil: 
R$247,935,501,903.75.82
• Pension funds sponsored by private entities are responsible for roughly 36. 8% of 
this number and pension funds sponsored by public entities are responsible for 
approximately 63. 2% of the total amount of investment assets.
2. Funds Sponsored by Private Entities
• Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to beneficiaries: 15.21%
• Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to the amount of investment 
assets: 20.43%
80
 Source: Ranking das EFPC por População Total - Posição em 28 de janeiro de 2005, avaliable at 
http://www.previdencia.gov.br/spc/docs/ranking_EFPCs_por_populacao_28_01_05.pdf.
81 MINISTÉRIO DA PREVIDENCIA SOCIAL, supra note 3, 48.
82
 Source: Ranking de Investimentos das EFPC - Posição em 28 de janeiro de 2005, avaliable at 
http://www.previdencia.gov.br/spc/docs/ranking_de_Invest_EFPCs_em_28_01_05.pdf.
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3.  Funds Sponsored by Public Entities
• Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to beneficiaries: 24.67%
• Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to the investment assets: 55.69%
4.  Representativeness of the Full Sample
• Representativeness of the sample in relation to beneficiaries: 39.88%
• Representativeness of the sample in relation to the investment assets: 76.13%
5. Representativeness of Each Sub-Sample in Relation to the Full Sample
• Pension funds sponsored by private entities 
o Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to the full sample 
regarding participants: 38.13%
o Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to the full sample 
regarding investment assets: 26.87%
• Pension funds sponsored by private entities 
o Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to the full sample 
regarding participants: 61.86%
o Representativeness of the sub-sample in relation to the full sample 
regarding investment assets: 73.15%
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